South Carolina Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 7

Summer 2011

Not Perfect, but Better than Most: South Carolina's TPR Process
and Its Surprisingly Fair Treatment of Incarcerated Parents
Stuart M. Jones Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stuart M. Jones Jr., Not Perfect, but Better than Most: South Carolina's TPR Process and Its Surprisingly
Fair Treatment of Incarcerated Parents, 62 S. C. L. Rev. 697 (2011).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Jones: Not Perfect, but Better than Most: South Carolina's TPR Process a

NOT PERFECT, BUT BETTER THAN MOST: SOUTH CAROLINA'S TPR PROCESS
AND ITS SURPRISINGLY FAIR TREATMENT OF INCARCERATED PARENTS
1.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................

II.

STATUTORY TPR APPROACHES .................................................................
700
A. Overview of the Various Statutory Approaches .................................. 700
B. South Carolina'sStatutoryApproach.................................................702

III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S
TPR STATUTE.............................................................................................

Beyond the Letter of the Law: Two Judicially Created
Requirements that Have Helped to FurtherEnhance
South Carolina'sTPR Process............................................................
B. When Termination Strikes: Courts' Treatment of the
TPR Statute When Termination is Deemed Proper,and
the DisturbingTrend that Has Arisen in the PrisonerParent
Context When Termination Occurs .....................................................

697

703

A.

703

706

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA .......................... 709
A. Follow Wisconsin's Lead andAmend the State's TPR Statute
so that All Courts Are Required to Look at Certain
Factors When Addressing the Best Interests of the Child...................710
B. Amend the State's TPR Statute to Permit the PostTermination RestorationofParentalRights so that the
State Can Begin to Combat the GrowingLegal Orphan Problem......711
C. ProvideNotice to Prisonersof Their ParentalRequirements
While in Prison so that the Needfor the Termination of
PrisonerParentalRights Diminishes..................................................
712
V . C ONCLU SION ..............................................................................................

I.

713

INTRODUCTION

The United States has the largest prison population in the world.! An
estimated 2.3 million people are in U.S. prisons today, representing a 500%
increase since 1980.2 This increase has led to prison overcrowding and budget
shortfalls,3 as many state governments have been saddled by budget constraints

1.

NAACP Supports Legislation to Help States Reduce Prison Populations, NAACP,

http://www.naacp.org/action-alerts/entry/naacp-supports-legislation-to-help-states-reduce-prisonpopulations/ (lasted visited May 9, 2011).
2.

Id.

3.

Id.
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and the growing burden of funding and supporting a "rapidly expanding penal
system."
However, the increasingly frequent issue of the termination of a
prisoner's parental rights is too often overlooked in the context of the problems
that accompany an expanding prison population.
As of 2007, 52% of all prisoners were parents; 6 moreover, nearly 1.7 million
children had a parent in prison, which represents an 82% increase since 1991.7
Because so few of these children live in two-parent homes, most are placed
either in a relative's home or in foster care. This removal of children from the
natural parent's home, coupled with the average state prison sentence for
nonviolent criminal offenses resting at 51.6 months,9 has resulted in many
children being separated from their parents for extended periods and has forced
courts to entertain actions involving the termination of parental rights.
Incarcerated parents are of particular concern in South Carolina. The
number of prisoners in the state who are parents is considerable: 78% of women
in prison in South Carolina are mothers, and 62% of male prisoners are fathers. 10
Accordingly, this high incarceration rate has increased actions to terminate
parental rights.
South Carolina, just as every other state in the Union, statutorily permits a
court to terminate an individual's parental rights. This decision, however, does
not come without great consideration. The South Carolina Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he termination of the legal relationship between natural parents
and a child presents one [of] the most difficult issues [it] is called upon to
decide."1 2 This difficulty arises because "termination of parental rights is both
total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with
no right to visit or communicate with the child, to participate in, or even to know

4.
at A4.
5.

Sara Murray, States Face Budget Shortfalls of $26.7 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2010,

NAACP Supports Legislation to Help States Reduce PrisonPopulations,supranote 1.
SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 2 (2009).
7.
Id.

6.

8.

Id. at 1.

9.

Stephanie Sherry, Note, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce its Negative

Impact on Children ofIncarceratedParents, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 380, 380 (2010) (citing Matthew R.
Durose & Christopher J. Mumola, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting
State Prisons, BUREAU JUST. STAT. FACT SHEET, Oct. 2004, at 1, 3 tbl.8, available at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf. tbl.8 (2004)).
10. Cindy Landrum, Children, with Parents in Prison, J. WATCHDOG (July 19, 2010, 6:01

AM), http://www.joumalwatchdog.com/crime/702-the-children.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2010); Grounds for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights,
CHILD
WELFARE
INFORMATION
GATEWAY,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.cfm (last visited May

9,2011).
12. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 364 S.C. 621, 626, 614 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2005).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/7
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about, any important decision affecting the child's religious, educational,
emotional, or physical development." 13
Additionally, the decision to terminate parental rights forces courts to weigh
"the protection of family integrity [against] the protection of children."1 4 Courts,
out of resPect for "family autonomy," do try to limit state intervention in familial
relations. However, the concern for family autonomy conflicts at times with
the state's interest in guaranteeing a child's "safety and well-being" when he is
incapable of caring for himself. Consequently, courts throughout the country
have determined that when a parent's care, or lack thereof, endangers a child's
well-being, the family's interest must give way to the state's interest in the
protection of minors.
This determination has created a number of issues, including whether a
parent's incarceration jeopardizes the well-being of the child. Many states have
concluded that incarceration does jeopardize a child's well-being and have listed
imprisonment as a statutory ground for termination of parental rights (TPR). 8
The remaining states, however, have reasoned that incarceration alone is not
enough to warrant the commencement of a TPR action. 19 Surprisingly, South
Carolina, a state sometimes viewed as unsympathetic to prisoners,2 0 is a member
of the latter group. 21
Despite South Carolina's balanced approach to TPR in the prison context,
however, some concerns with the current process exist. In particular, the state
legislature needs to recognize that (1) the "best interests" prong of South
Carolina's statutory TPR test needs further development to ensure that all courts
address certain factors when handling TPR actions, (2) the statute allows for the
creation of legal orphans, and (3) incarcerated parents deserve some added
protections in the statute. Therefore, this Comment contends that although South
Carolina has a TPR process superior to that of many other states, the South

13. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
14. Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, ParentalRights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A
False Dichotomy in the Context ofAdoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 64 (1995).
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. See id. at 64-65.
18. See Maryann Zavez, Use of the Adoption and Safe Families Act at 15/22 Months for
IncarceratedParents, 33 VT. L. REv. 187, 189 (2008) (citing ARLENE E. LEE ET. AL., CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT ON
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 11 (2005)).

19. See id. at 190-91.
20. See ACLU Calls for Independent Audit of South CarolinaDepartment of Corrections,

ACLU (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/aclu-calls-independent-audit-southcarolina-department-corrections ("[N]umerous complaints during the past several years from
prisoners in South Carolina . .. complain about grossly inadequate medical and mental health care,
involuntary drugging and physical restraint of inmates with mental illness, sexual assault,
overcrowding[,] and harsh disciplinary measures without due process.").
21. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Ledford, 357 S.C. 371, 376, 593 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ct. App.
2004).
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Carolina General Assembly needs to address the three issues listed above to
better ensure that the best interests of the children involved in TPR actions are
served and that prisoner parents are given a fair opportunity to retain their
parental rights. In so contending, Part II of this Comment discusses the various
ways in which states statutorily approach the termination of parental rights for
incarcerated parents and demonstrates why South Carolina's extensive, factdriven analysis is most appropriate. Part III addresses South Carolina TPR case
law and the ways in which South Carolina courts have interpreted and treated the
state's TPR statute.
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment offers some
recommendations for how the legislature can resolve the three concerns noted
above.
II.

STATUTORY TPR APPROACHES

A. Overview of the Various Statutory Approaches
The termination of parental rights ends the legal parent-child relationship,
severing all "privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations" that exist between a
parent and child.22 For this reason, some courts view TPR as the "most serious"
matter that a family court considers.23 States handle TPR for incarcerated
parents in a variety of ways. Some states provide for TPR if the parent is
imprisoned for a certain length of time, while others weigh external factors
before reaching a decision to terminate.24 Most states' statutes, however,
25
provide that incarceration is grounds for a TPR proceeding to commence.
Consequently, it should surprise few that these statutes, in conjunction with an
increasing number of incarcerated parents, have resulted in a substantial increase
in incarcerated parent TPR proceedings each year.26
By 2005, TPR statutes in thirty-six states listed a parent's incarceration as an
element to be considered in a TPR proceeding. 27 Twenty-five of these states use
the length of the parent's prison sentence as a determining factor in whether
incarceration is grounds for a TPR action.2 8 Some of these states specify exactly
how long a parent must be imprisoned, while others speak in broader terms. For
instance, Utah requires that the parent be imprisoned for only one year before

22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2590(A) (2010). The only right that remains is a child's right to
inherit from the parent, which is terminable solely by a final adoption order. Id
23. Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 335 S.C. 648, 654, 518 S.E.2d 51, 54 (Ct. App. 1999).
24. See Steven Fleischer, Note, Termination of ParentalRights: An Additional Sentence for
IncarceratedParents,29 SETON HALL L. REv. 312, 325-26 (1998).
25. See Zavez, supra note 18, at 189 (citing LEE ET AL., supranote 18, at 11).

26. See id. (citing LEE ET AL., supranote 18, at 20) ("From 1992 to 2002, the number of TPR
proceedings [involving incarcerated parents] per year increased from 113 to 394.").
27.
28.

Id. (citing LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 11).
Zavez, supra note 18, at 189 (citing LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 11).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/7
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statutory grounds for a TPR action exist,29 while other states, such as Florida,
require that "the state show the incarceration will last a 'substantial portion of
the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years."' 30
Other states that consider the parents' incarceration in the TPR process
provide that the committal of certain crimes is grounds for TPR.31 For example,
Massachusetts allows for the commencement of a TPR action when a parent
faces imprisonment for crimes such as murder or assault of the child or another
child in the parent's household.32 Although few commentators have criticized
this latter group of states, some have argued that focusing on the length of the
parent's prison sentence helps create a "commit a crime and lose your child
policy" due to long prison sentences and stem drug laws.33
This criticism largely stems from the fact that in many states, the
predominant consideration when determining whether termination is proper is
whether the parent satisfied a statutory basis for TPR. 34 These courts may look
at the best interests of the child in question, but "the burden to demonstrate
unfitness or abandonment is greatly diminished or nonexistent because criminal
status essentially provides the basis for termination." 35
A minority of states, however, have concluded that imprisonment alone is
36
not sufficient for a TPR proceeding to arise.
These jurisdictions correctly
reason that "[s]tates that terminate parental rights based on incarceration status
may permanently sever the important, positive relationship that a parent and
child share." 37 Consequently, these states require their courts to look at the

29. Zavez, supra note 18, at 189 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-408(2)(e) (West 1953 &
Supp. 2002)).
30.

Mimi Laver, IncarceratedParents: What You Should Know When Handlingan Abuse or

Neglect Case, 20 CHILD LAW PRAC. 145, 152 (2001) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)
(2001)).
31.

See id. at 153.

32. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (West 2010) ("The department of social
services shall file a petition ... to dispense with parental consent to adoption, custody, guardianship
or other disposition of the child . . . [if] the parent has been convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of such parent ... or of any
assault constituting a felony which results in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of
the parent .... ).
33. Sherry, supra note 9, at 381 (quoting CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA LAW
AND THE CHILDREN OF PRISONERS 3 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34.

Raquel Ellis et al., The Timing of Termination of ParentalRights: A BalancingAct for

Children's Best Interests, RES. BRIEF (Child Trends, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2009, at 1, 4, available at
http://www.childtrends.org/Files//ChildTrends-2009_09_09 RB LegalOrphans.pdf. In a study of
twenty family court judges throughout the United States, Child Trends, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
research center, found that "[n]early all judges reported that the factor most critical to consider in
determining whether to terminate parental rights is whether the parents have met state statutory
grounds for TPR." Id.
35. See Fleischer,supra note 24, at 313.
36. See id. at 334-35 ("These states consider the varied psychological effects of incarceration
and understand the need for an approach that focuses on the child's best interests and makes
individualized determinations prior to terminating a parent's rights.").
37. Id. at 314-15.
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support for, relationship with, and time away from the child, in conjunction with
the child's best interests, to determine if TPR is proper.38
B. South Carolina'sStatutoryApproach
South Carolina's TPR statute states that the purpose of allowing TPR
proceedings
is to establish procedures for the reasonable and compassionate
termination of parental rights where children are abused, neglected, or
abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children
and make them eligible for adoption by persons who will provide a
suitable home environment and the love and care necessary for a happy,
healthful, and productive life. 39
The South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS) or any
interested party may file an action for TPR40 with the family court, which
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over TPR proceedings.41 The petitioner must
not only prove at least one of the eleven grounds listed for TPR, but also must
show that TPR is in the best interests of the child.42 Though all eleven grounds
are potentially relevant to an incarcerated parent, four main provisions are of
particular concern for imprisoned parents: willful failure to visit the child, willful
failure to support the child, abandonment, and the child's residing in foster care
for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. 43 If the court finds that one of

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Carolina:

See id. at 335.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2510 (2010 & Supp. 2010).
S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-2530(A) (Supp. 2010).
§ 63-7-2520 (2010).
§ 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2010).
See id. The following provisions are most relevant to incarcerated parents in South

(3) The child has lived outside the home of either parent for a period of six months,
and during that time the parent has wilfully failed to visit the child. The court may attach
little or no weight to incidental visitations, but it must be shown that the parent was not
prevented from visiting by the party having custody or by court order. The distance of
the child's placement from the parent's home must be taken into consideration when
determining the ability to visit.
(4) The child has lived outside the home of either parent for a period of six months,
and during that time the parent has wilfully failed to support the child. Failure to support
means that the parent has failed to make a material contribution to the child's care. A
material contribution consists of either financial contributions according to the parent's
means or contributions of food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities for the care of the
child according to the parent's means. The court may consider all relevant circumstances
in determining whether or not the parent has wilfully failed to support the child, including
requests for support by the custodian and the ability of the parent to provide support.
(7) The child has been abandoned as defined in Section 63-7-20.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/7
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the grounds for TPR has been met and that termination is in the best interests of
the child, the court may issue an order that permanently terminates the prisoner's
parental rights.4 4 South Carolina's TPR statute, in conjunction with judicial
interpretation of the statute, has helped create one of the more fair TPR processes
in the country.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S TPR STATUTE
A.

Beyond the Letter of the Law: Two Judicially Created Requirements
that Have Helped to FurtherEnhance South Carolina'sTPR Process

As noted above, South Carolina courts are required to apply a two-part test
in all TPR proceedings. 4 5 Courts must first determine if there is "clear and
convincing evidence" that at least one of the statutory grounds has been met.46 If
that standard is satisfied, courts must then reason whether termination is in the
child's best interests. 4 7 In making this determination, however, courts have not
simply applied the law as written, but have incorporated requirements not found
in the statute.
First, the Court of Appeals has held that an incarcerated parent cannot be
subjected to a TPR action for failure to visit or support a child when that failure
results from actions or policies that SCDSS or any other governmental entity
48
institutes.
In South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Wilson, the

Court of Appeals reversed the family court's TPR order and held that SCDSS's
preventing an incarcerated father from visiting his children, coupled with prison
policies that prevented him from earning an income, did not demonstrate the
father's willful choice to ignore his parental responsibilities. 4 9
In Wilson, a father of three was convicted of distributing cocaine.50 Two
years after the conviction, SCDSS took all three children into emergency

protective custody because of their mother's neglect.5 1 During this time, the
father repeatedly sought to visit his children, but SCDSS refused his requests.52
The father also found it impossible to provide monetary aid to the children, as

(8) The child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen
of the most recent twenty-two months.
Id.

44. § 63-7-2580(A) (2010).
45. See § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2010).
46. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 417, 589 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2003)
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-78 (1982); Richland Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Earles, 330 S.C. 24, 32, 496 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1998)).
47. See § 63-7-2570.
48. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wilson, 344 S.C. 332, 338-40, 543 S.E.2d 580, 583-84
(Ct. App. 2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 334, 543 S.E.2d at 581.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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prison policies prevented him from earning an income.53 SCDSS filed an action
to terminate the father's parental rights "because he failed to visit and support
the children for a six-month period."54 The family court agreed and ordered
TPR, but the Court of Appeals reversed.56
The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]o determine whether a parent's
failure to support or visit during the time of incarceration evinces a settled
purpose to forego parental responsibilities requires a comprehensive analysis of
all of the facts and circumstances."5 7 Here, the father's failure to support or visit
his children stemmed not from his own desire or actions but from SCDSS
decisions and penitentiary policies.58 The court first looked at the parent-child
relationship before the father was incarcerated and found that "[t]here [was] no
evidence in the record that the father failed in his parental responsibilities to
support or provide the children with a stable home prior to his incarceration." 5 9
The court then looked at the father's relationship with his children while
incarcerated.60 The father visited with the children early in his imprisonment,
but these visitations ceased when SCDSS took custody of the children. 6 1 Despite
the father's repeated requests to see his children, SCDSS refused his attempts. 62
Consequently, the court held that SCDSS failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the father willfully failed to support or visit his children. 63 More
importantly, the court recognized that South Carolina courts cannot terminate the
parental rights of an incarcerated individual when that parent's failure to visit or
support stems solely from the actions or policies of SCDSS or another
government actor.64
South Carolina courts also have held that the "best interests" prong is the
"paramount consideration" for courts and that it should be far more heavily
weighed than the first prong.65 For example, in Charleston County Department
of Social Services v. Jackson,66 the Court of Appeals reversed the family court's
TPR order, holding that termination would not be in the child's best interests
despite the existence of statutory grounds for TPR.67 In Jackson, the father was

53. Id. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 583.
54. Id. at 335, 543 S.E.2d at 581.
55. Id. at 335, 543 S.E.2d at 581-82.
56. Id. at 340, 543 S.E.2d at 584.
57. Id. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 584.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 339-40, 543 S.E.2d at 584.
64. See id. at 338-39, 543 S.E.2d at 583-84.
65. See, e.g., S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sims, 359 S.C. 601, 605, 598 S.E.2d 303, 306 (Ct.
App. 2004); Doe v. Baby Boy Roe, 353 S.C. 576, 579, 578 S.E.2d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing
S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000)).
66. 368 S.C. 87, 627 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2006).
67. Id. at 101-04, 627 S.E.2d at 773-75.
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incarcerated for first degree assault and robbery in New York three months
before his child was born.68 Less than a year later, the father confirmed his
paternity of the child and "tried to send [the c]hild his limited inmate earnings." 69
These efforts failed, however, because the mother and child moved to South
Carolina without informing the father.70 For the next four years, the father wrote
hundreds of letters to government officials, agencies, and other organizations in
an effort to find his son. Meanwhile, the Charleston County Department of
Social Services (DSS) removed the child from the mother's custody and
terminated her parental rights because of abuse and abandonment.72
Largely through his own efforts, the father finally located his son in August
of 2000, and spent much of the next year writing DSS and eXressing his wish to
establish regular communication with DSS and his child. His efforts went
mostly unnoticed, however, and approximately twelve months later, DSS
instituted a TPR action against the father.74 After several continuances, the
family court agreed with DSS that TPR was appropriate and ordered the
termination of the father's parental rights. The court found that in addition to
statutory TPR grounds being present, termination was in the child's best
interest. 76
The father appealed, arguing, among other things, that TPR was not in his
son's best interest.n The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that the father's
connection with his child was a constitutionally protected "fundamental liberty
interest."78 More importantly, however, the court looked to the child's
adoptability, the impact TPR would have on the child's stability, the incarcerated
parent's concern for the child's well-being, and the parent's relationship or
potential relationship with the child.7 9
Although the court found that statutory grounds for TPR had been satisfied
due to the child's residing in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two
months, 0 it reasoned that TPR was not in the best interests of the child: "Unless
long-term incarceration alone is enough to terminate parental rights, which is not
the case in South Carolina, we cannot discern an

evidence . . . indicating

termination would be in [the c]hild's best interests."8 The court first considered

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id

at 91, 627 S.E.2d at 767-68.
at 91, 627 S.E.2d at 768.
at 91 n.2, 627 S.E.2d at 768 n.2.
at 91, 627 S.E.2d at 768.
at 92, 627 S.E.2d at 768.
at 92-94, 627 S.E.2d at 768-69.
at 95, 627 S.E.2d at 769-70.
at 95, 627 S.E.2d at 770.
at 102, 627 S.E.2d at 774.
at 104, 627 S.E.2d at 775 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
at 101-02, 627 S.E.2d at 773.
at 104, 627 S.E.2d at 774-75.
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the future stability of the child and the potential for adoption, finding that while
the child's foster parents wished to remain as such, they had expressed no
interest in adopting the child.82 Thus, the court determined that terminating the
father's parental rights would "not ensure future stability for [the c]hild." 83
Furthermore, the court reasoned that preserving the father's parental rights
would not affect his son's living situation, because the father-still
incarcerated-would not receive custody. 4 Instead, the father would simply
keep the "right to connect with" and the duty to support his child. 5 Finally,
while the father's relationship with his son was "faint," it was "nevertheless
existent," as his clear desire to provide emotional and monetary support to the
child was evidence of his concern for the child's welfare. 86 Therefore, with all
these factors present, the court determined that despite the statutory grounds for
TPR, termination was not in the best interests of the child.
B.

When Termination Strikes: Courts' Treatment of the TPR Statute When
Termination is Deemed Proper, and the Disturbing Trend that Has
Arisen in the PrisonerParentContext When Termination Occurs

The court's holding in Jackson, however, does not mean that South Carolina
courts will not order TPR. In fact, in the prison context, courts have shown a
willingness to order TPR when an incarcerated parent demonstrates an aversion
to, or disinterest in, contacting or supporting the child.
For instance, in South CarolinaDepartment of Social Services v. Parker,89

the Court of Appeals affirmed the family court's TPR order, holding that
termination of a prisoner's parental rights was in the best interests of the child
because the incarcerated father willfully failed to visit and support his child. 90 In
Parker, the father was imprisoned on drug charges shortly after his daughter's
birth. 91 The child initially resided with her mother following the father's
incarceration, but, due to the mother's drug addiction and neglect, the Richland
County Department of Social Services (DSS) took custody of the child and
placed her in foster care.92 When the child was almost two years old, DSS filed

82. Id at 102-03, 627 S.E.2d at 774.
83. Id at 103, 627 S.E.2d at 774.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id at 103-04, 627 S.E.2d at 774-75.
87. Id at 104, 627 S.E.2d at 775.
88. See, e.g., S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Truitt, 361 S.C. 272, 281-82, 603 S.E.2d 867, 87273 (Ct. App. 2004); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Ledford, 357 S.C. 371, 376-78, 593 S.E.2d 175,
177-78 (Ct. App. 2004).
89. 336 S.C. 248, 519 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1999).
90. Id. at 259, 519 S.E.2d at 356-57.
91. See id. at 251-53, 519 S.E.2d at 352-54.
92. Id. at 251-52, 519 S.E.2d at 353.
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an action seeking to terminate the father's parental rights.93 The father
contested, but the family court granted TPR, citing the father's lack of contact
with and support of the child as well as his incarceration.94
In affirming the family court's ruling, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
the father made no attempt to locate the child between the time of his
incarceration in 1994 and his receipt of the summons and complaint for TPR in
1996. 95 Although the father made some efforts to locate his daughter
after beinE
served, he never attempted to visit with her during the proceedings.
Furthermore, despite the fact that the father earned between $30 and $35 each
month, he spent the money on cigarettes, h giene products, and telephone calls,
instead of financially supporting his child. Although the father claimed that he
was unaware of his obligation to pay child support, the court said that he was not
entitled to receive such notice under the law.9 The court, therefore, found that
the father met the statutory grounds for TPR because he willfully failed to
support and visit his child.99
Upon concluding that statutory grounds for TPR existed, the court then held
that the family court was correct in determining that TPR was in the best
interests of the child. 100 Unlike the extended analysis of the "best interests"
prong in Jackson, the court provided only a brief discussion 01 of what South
Carolina courts have called "the paramount consideration" in a TPR action.102
Disregarding factors such as the child's potential for adoption and the potential
for a relationship between the child and her father, the court focused squarely on
the existence of an "enduring relationship," stating, "[P]arental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring."103 In looking to the facts at hand, the
court found that
[a]n enduring relationship [was] not present between [the] father
and [the child]. Father has seen his daughter only once, when she was 2
months old. He will not see her again until she is ten years old. Had
Father made a recognizable effort to visit with his daughter, or to

93. Id at 253, 519 S.E.2d at 353.
94. Id at 253, 519 S.E.2d at 353-54.
95. Id at 256, 519 S.E.2d at 355-56.
96. Id at 256-58, 519 S.E.2d at 356.
97. Id at 258, 519 S.E.2d at 356.
98. Id
99. See id. at 256, 519 S.E.2d at 355.
100. Id at 259, 519 S.E.2d at 357.
101. Id at 258-59, 519 S.E.2d at 356-57.
102. See cases cited supra note 65.
103. Parker,336 S.C. at 259, 519 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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provide support for her, there may have been evidence of an "enduring
relationship."104
Therefore, the court held that the lack of an enduring relationship, coupled
with the father's willful failure to support and visit the child, warranted
affirmation of the family court's holding that termination was appropriate. 05
Many may contend that the court's decision in Parker to terminate the
incarcerated father's parental rights was the correct decision. The father had
shown little interest in the child and had not provided the child with any financial
support.106 Nonetheless, the court's limited analysis of the "best interests" prong
is troubling. More concerning, however, is that the court's treatment of the "best
interests" prong in Parker may be the norm when an incarcerated parent has not
established or attempted to establish an enduring relationship. The case of South
CarolinaDepartment ofSocial Services v. Ledfordi0 7 illustrates this point.

In Ledford, the Court of Appeals once again provided minimal discussion of
the "best interests" prong in holding that sufficient evidence supported the
family court's finding that the incarcerated father effectively abandoned his
daughter and that termination of his parental rights was proper.108 In Ledford,
the child's father was incarcerated twice before the child reached the age of
six. 109 During the second incarceration, the father and mother divorced, and
soon thereafter, the father lost contact with both the mother and his child.110 The
child initially resided with her mother after the father was imprisoned, but after
only a short time, the child was placed in SCDSS emergency protective custody
because of the mother's drug abuse and eventual disappearance.
Approximately two years later, SCDSS filed for the termination of the father's
parental rights on grounds of abandonment and willful failure to visit and
support. 112 The family court agreed with SCDSS and terminated the father's
parental rights. 113
In affirming the family court's ruling, the Court of Appeals found that clear
and convincing evidence demonstrated that the father had abandoned his
daughter.114 While in prison, the father made only two attempts to contact his
daughter, 15 and even after he learned that SCDSS had custody of the child, he

104. Id. at 259, 519 S.E.2d at 356-57.
105. Id. at 259, 519 S.E.2d at 357.
106. See id. at 256-58, 519 S.E.2d at 355-56.

107. 357 S.C. 371, 593 S.E.2d 175 (Ct. App. 2004).
108. Id. at 377, 593 S.E.2d at 177-78.
109. Id. at 373, 593 S.E.2d at 176.
110. Id. at 373-74, 593 S.E.2d at 176.
111. Id. at 374, 593 S.E.2d at 176.

112. Id. at 374-75, 593 S.E.2d at 176.
113. Id. at 375, 593 S.E.2d at 176.
114. See id. at 377, 593 S.E.2d at 178.
115. See id. at 376, 593 S.E.2d at 177. On the first attempt, the father asked prison officials to

help locate the child, but they refused, and the father did nothing further. Id. at 374, 593 S.E.2d at
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showed no interest in changing her living arrangements.116 The court did not
base its finding of abandonment on the father's incarceration alone; rather, it also
noted117that the father had not ensured "that his daughter was continually cared
for.,
However, similar to its opinion in Parker, the court provided minimal
discussion of the "best interests" prong of the statutory TPR test. 18 For
instance, the court did not discuss the child's adoptability and the impact TPR
could have on the child's stability. Instead, in one sentence, it stated that TPR
was in the child's best interest because of the lack of recent communication
between father and daughter, and because of testimony from the child's guardian
ad litem and foster mother stating that termination was best for the child. 19
South Carolina courts clearly have been instrumental in helping to give
added protections to prisoner parents in the TPR process through policies such as
those found in Wilson and Jackson. However, as seen in Parker and Ledford,

courts have also simultaneously minimized the "best interests" inquiry when the
incarcerated parent has not established or attempted to establish an enduring
relationship with the child. Consequently, this Comment argues that courts
should stringently apply a "best interests" analysis in all TPR actions, regardless
of whether the parent has formed or attempted to form an enduring bond with the
child.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA
As detailed above, South Carolina has arguably one of the better TPR
approaches in the country. Unwilling to recognize imprisonment alone as
sufficient for a TPR order, 120 South Carolina's extensive, fact-driven analysis is
one that many states would do well to emulate. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier
and more fully developed below, problems do exist in South Carolina's
approach. In particular, the TPR statute provides little guidance to courts on
which factors to apply when considering the best interests of the child; the TPR
process is susceptible to the legal orphan problem; and the TPR statute fails to
provide some basic protections that all incarcerated parents deserve. To combat
these problems, the General Assembly should consider the following revisions to
the TPR statute.

176. On the second attempt, he tried to send the child a birthday card via the child's half sister, but
the card was returned as undeliverable. Id.
116. Id. at 376, 593 S.E.2d at 177.
117. Id. at 376-77, 593 S.E.2d at 177-78.
118. Id. at 377, 593 S.E.2d at 177-78.
119. Id. at 377, 593 S.E.2d at 178.
120. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2010).
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Follow Wisconsin's Lead and Amend the TPR Statute so that All Courts
Are Required to Look at Certain Factors When Addressing the Best
Interests of the Child

In construing South Carolina's two-part TPR test, courts have emphatically
stated that the "best interests" prong is the "paramount consideration."
However, the TPR statute provides courts with little guidance on how to make a
proper "best interests" determination.122 The statute states only that TPR must
be in the best interests of the child and thus grants courts wide discretion in
determining whether TPR would lead to such a result. Courts have considered
factors such as "the length of time a child has lived with prospective adoptive
parents, the stability of the child's current placement, the bond between the
children in a sibling group, ... the importance of maintaining a sibling group in
the same placement," the child's progress while in foster care, and the bond
between the child and the child's natural family and prospective adoptive
parents.123 Though all of these factors certainly are relevant to the best interest
discussion, case law demonstrates that courts do not employ them uniformly. 12 4
In contrast with South Carolina, Wisconsin requires each court to consider,
at a minimum, six factors in evaluating a child's best interest: 125 the likelihood of
post-termination adoption, the child's age and health, whether the child has
developed a relationship with the parent, the child's wishes, the duration of the
child's separation from the parent, and whether the child's post-termination
living situation will be more stable.126
By adopting these factors, South Carolina would achieve the goals of
uniformity and clarity. Uniformity would reduce the likelihood of judge-specific
outcomes and could reduce appeals as well. Moreover, by mandating that courts
address adoptability, the legislature would help prevent the "legal orphan"
problem because it would preclude courts from freeing children from their
biological parents when those children are unlikely to be adopted due to age or
disability.

121. See cases cited supra note 65.
122. See § 63-7-2570 ("The family court may order the termination of parental rights upon a
finding ... that termination is in the best interest of the child. . . .").
123. Children's Law Center, Termination of Parental Rights, CHILD L. CENTER, 8,
http://childlaw.sc.edu/frmPublications/TerminationofParentalRights.pdf (last visited May 10, 2011).
124. Compare S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 256-59, 519 S.E.2d 351,
355-56 (Ct. App. 1999) (terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights because he had failed
to form an enduring relationship with the child), with S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Janice C., 383
S.C. 221, 230-231, 678 S.E.2d 463, 468 (Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to terminate a mentally disabled
mother's parental rights because the children had found stability in foster care, the mother would be
able to visit the children in foster care, and no adoptive parents had been identified at the time of the
TPR action.).
125. WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) (2010).
126. Id.
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B. Amend the State's TPR Statute to Permit the Post-Termination
Restoration of ParentalRights so that the State Can Begin to Combat
the GrowingLegal Orphan Problem

The goal in granting a TPR order is to make children "eligible for adoption
by persons who will provide a suitable home environment."1 27 However,
terminating a parent's parental rights does not ensure that the child will be
adopted. 12 When adoption does not occur, the "children are left in legal
limbo."1 29 This has been termed the "legal orphan" problem. 130 By terminating
parental rights without addressing adoptability, courts unintentionally create
legal orphans.
Termination of the legal relationship between a parent and child has
detrimental social, financial, and emotional effects on the child.131 These effects,
combined with the often unstable living situation of children who are not
adopted post-TPR, can lead these children down a path of future unemployment,
poverty, and homelessness. Because of these risks, South Carolina should
consider amending its TPR statute-which provides that terminations are
permanentl32 -to allow for post-termination reinstatement of parental rights.
As of 2010, at least ten states had passed or were considering laws that
would permit the restoration of parental rights.133 These laws are evidence of
states' recognition of the extensive problems associated with legal orphans. 134
For example, Hawaii's TPR statute provides that once termination has been
effective for at least a year, the parent or child-placing agency may petition the
court to reconsider its order if "the child has not been adopted or placed in a
prospective adoptive home." 35
South Carolina's General Assembly could also provide for the possible
reinstatement of parental rights by amending the TPR statute to allow a parent to
reattain parental rights if (1) two years have passed and the child is not adopted
and is in foster care, (2) the parent has been rehabilitated, and (3) the
reinstatement of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. This
amendment would not mandate that the child be placed in the natural parent's
custody. Instead, it would simply allow for visitation and reinstatment of the
basic privileges and requirements of parenthood. It would also implicitly

127. S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-2510 (2010).
128. LaShanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-terminating Parental

Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC.POL'Y & L. 318, 325 (2010).
129. Id. (citing Gretta Cushing & Sarah B. Greenblatt, Vulnerability to Foster Care Drift
After the Termination ofParentalRights, 19 RES. ON Soc. WORK PRAC. 694, 698 (2009)).
130. Kirstin Andreasen, Comment, Eliminatingthe Legal Orphan Problem, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISsUES 351, 351 (2007).

131. Taylor, supranote 128, at 326-27.
132. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-2580 (2010).
133. Taylor, supranote 128, at 331.
134. See id.
135. HAw. REV. STAT.
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recognize the importance of the parent-child relationship, which is critical to a
child's development:
The biological family is the primary lifeline for children. . . .
Although only intermittent contact may have occurred, biological
parents, even when inadequate, continue to be significant in a child's
development. The biological family is the source of identity for a child.
Children feel part of the biological family and its roots: they resemble
their parents, possess some personality traits of their parents, and have
the family health problems. . . .

Although their hopes are often

unrealistic, children wish that their biological parents would provide
those elements of nurturing which they have not provided in the past. 136
This proposed amendment not only would allow a rehabilitated parent,
whether incarcerated or not, to begin forming the familial bond children
desperately need and wish for, but also would greatly help eliminate the legal
orphan problem.
C. Provide Notice to Prisoners of Their ParentalRequirements While in
Prison so that the Needfor the Termination of PrisonerParentalRights
Diminishes

South Carolina's General Assembly can also amend the state's TPR statute
to provide additional protection to incarcerated parents. First, prisoner parents
can be unaware of their obligation to pay child support while imprisoned.
Earning meager or no wages, incarcerated parents in TPR proceedings have
argued that no request was made on them for support.137 To provide added
protection to imprisoned parents in this context, the legislature should amend
section 63-7-2570(4) of the South Carolina Code back to its pre-1992 form.
Before 1992, a court could not issue a TPR order on the basis of a parent's
failure to provide support "unless the child's custodian requested support from
the parent."1 3 8 Now, however, whether a parent has been asked to pay support is
merely one factor for a court to consider in determining if the parent has
willfully failed to support a child.139 By requiring that a request for support be
made before failure to support becomes a basis for termination, South Carolina

136. Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on
Termination of ParentalRights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233, 237-38 (1986) (footnote
omitted) (citing Fein, Maluccio, Hamilton, and Ward, After Fostercare: Outcomes of Permancy
Planningfor Children,62 CHILD WELFARE 485 (1983)).

137. See supranote 98 and accompanying text
138. Stinecipher v. Ballington, 366 S.C. 92, 100, 620 S.E.2d 93, 97 (Ct. App. 2005).
139. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(4) (2010); Stinecipher, 366 S.C. at 100, 620 S.E.2d at
97 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(4) (Supp. 2004)); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cummings,
345 S.C. 288, 296, 547 S.E.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2001). The text of former section 20-7-1572 is
now found in section 63-7-2570.
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would not only provide the parent with fair notice of his or her obligation, but
also potentially reduce the number of TPR actions brought.
The legislature also should consider requiring SCDSS to provide each
imprisoned parent with written notice of the statutory grounds for a TPR order.
This would address the failure to support issue discussed above and would attend
to the problem of incarcerated parents not communicating with their children.
Parents may begin the prison sentence with attempts to contact the child, but due
to difficulties or unsuccessful attempts, give up on establishing a line of
communication, unaware that such actions are grounds for TPR.
V. CONCLUSION

South Carolina has one of the better TPR approaches in the United States.
Due to efforts by both the legislature and the courts, South Carolina employs a
detailed, fact-driven TPR approach that disallows a TPR order solely because a
parent is incarcerated. By doing so, the state has taken great strides in ensuring
not only that the best interests of the children involved in TPR actions are
served, but also that incarcerated parents are given a fair opportunity to retain
their parental rights. South Carolina can continue to improve its approach,
however, by amending its TPR statute to include guidance on applying the "best
interests" prong of the TPR test and by addressing the statute's tendency to
create legal orphans. Addressing these weaknesses of the state's TPR process
will ensure that South Carolina's approach remains favorable and becomes one
of the strongest approaches in the country.
StuartM Jones, Jr.
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